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In this issue of the Journal [J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg 2001;121:259-67],Neri and his colleagues provide empirical evidence to support sparingoctogenarians, their families, and their caregivers from the tragic experi-ence the authors encountered with operative treatment of type A dissectionsof the thoracic aorta. Of 24 consecutive surgically treated patients in thisage group, 8 died intraoperatively, 12 more died without leaving the
hospital, and none of the 4 who were discharged lived beyond 6 months. No
survivor returned to “a normal, functioning, integrated” life, the criterion used by the
Massachusetts courts to justify a physician’s decision to withhold resuscitative
measures.1 Their report is courageous, because poor outcomes are rarely published;
authors and journals usually compete instead to proclaim favorable results of cardiac
surgery in older patients. The Siena group recommends a professional guideline that
excludes octogenarians from surgical treatment of type A aortic aneurysms. In this
commentary, I will argue that creating a local institutional policy, with public as
well as professional participation, is a more prudent approach.
When patients, families, and surgeons are required to make decisions about the
initiation or withdrawal of heroic life-sustaining treatments, a clear and reasonable
institutional policy can be helpful to all. Judicious policies are now widely used to
enable the harvest of organs for transplantation and for protection of the irretriev-
ably ill from intubation and resuscitation by cardiac arrest teams.
Guidelines, as suggested by Neri and associates, can be helpful in establishing
the standard of care. They are respected by law courts, although not widely adopted
by practicing physicians. Guidelines are usually grounded in evidence-based argu-
ments, numerical proofs of futility, and lack of cost effectiveness; these are helpful
but insufficient2 bases for resolving the ethical quandary we face when an 83-year-
old patient arrives in the emergency room with tearing chest pain and a widened
mediastinum. When the patient is a “good, and very fit 83 year old,” surgeons
respond as warriors, rallying to the challenge of our mortal enemy. Desperate family
members plead for intervention despite heavy odds. Elderly patients, although more
reconciled to human finality than their younger rescuers, often entrust decision
making to their doctors and their families. Although some elderly patients want
every feasible lifesaving measure, educating them about poor outcomes reduces
demand for treatments like cardiopulmonary resuscitation.3
Guidelines are generally drawn up by physicians and adopted by physician
groups without public participation. British doctors established guidelines that
excluded older patients from dialysis; they were vilified when their decision came
to public notice.4 In contrast, policies (as their Latin root, polites—the citizens,
implies) often derive from a broader public process. Public participation is espe-
cially appropriate for making decisions to limit the care of citizens who are ill. The
United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) uses public consultation to ensure the
acceptance of its resource allocation decisions. Proposed policies affecting the dis-
tribution of organs are sent out “for public comment” to a broad spectrum of
citizens, including politicians, patient advocacy groups, and media commentators, to
assure transparency and public defensibility of the decision-making process.
Once accepted, publicly reviewed policies are extremely helpful in the proce-
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dural aspects of justice. In principle, age alone, like sex,
race, religion, level of intelligence, and other personal char-
acteristics, is not accepted as a morally relevant criterion for
just allocation of health care resources.5 Benefit and need
are the only criteria that should be used to guide these
decisions. Appropriately, Neri and his colleagues anchor the
logic of their proposal in the lack of benefit from their
intervention. Although age alone is not an acceptable crite-
rion for exclusion, it may serve, as argued by Neri’s group,
as a tightly linked proxy for the ability to benefit from
surgical treatment. An institutional policy based on this
linkage would stand up to public scrutiny so long as options
are offered for exceptional cases to be treated despite the
general policy, or to be referred elsewhere. Thoughtful
further discussion of the issue of age-based rationing can be
found in Beauchamp and Childress’s influential textbook of
bioethics.6
John Paris taught us at the University of Chicago’s
MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics how effective
“We don’t do that here” can be as an approach to resolving
conflicts when desperate families demand heroic and inap-
propriate treatments against the advice of caregivers.7 The
authoritative power of this maxim can be strengthened when
it is incorporated into a policy by the specification of “we”
to include the community rather than just the physicians, the
specification of “that” to a particular treatment or its appli-
cation in a particular patient group, and the specification of
“here” to recognize that the policy is particular to one
institution. Policies are restricted to the place and time they
are adopted; they may be amended in light of new informa-
tion or new capabilities. Some become widely adopted, such
as the “do not resuscitate” policy of the University of
Chicago Hospitals and the policy on discontinuation of life
support after brain death as defined at the Massachusetts
General Hospital. Such policies are based in part on data
from the medical literature and on the experience and values
of the institution, rather than “the personal predilections of
the practitioner.”8 Hospital policies that govern the alloca-
tion of health care resources should be just, equitable,
transparent, publicly defensible, implemented by a legiti-
mate authority, and subject to appeal in appropriate circum-
stances.9
Rather than attempting to convince professional organi-
zations to adopt treatment guidelines, Neri and his col-
leagues in the Unita Toracica can help their hospital develop
a policy based on their data. The process should include a
conversation with informed members of the public, such as
former cardiac surgery and intensive care patients, their
relatives, and other interested and capable citizens. Public
conversation about the acceptance of death, the quality of
end-of-life care, and legitimate priority setting will enable
them to follow Paris’s proscription of heroic treatments that
complicate the dying process without preserving purposeful
life. I believe that informed octogenarian patients, their
families, and their caregivers will welcome a policy on type
A thoracic aortic aneurysms that limits the goals of treat-
ment to comfort and dignity.
I am grateful to John Paris and Peter A. Singer for helpful
comments on an earlier version of this commentary.
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